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Homesley: The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Extended to Successive State Prosec

THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE EXTENDED TO
SUCCESSIVE STATE PROSECUTIONS-Heath v. Alabama.
INTRODUCTION

The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
,1 Generally, this means
that once jeopardy attaches,2 a defendant cannot be tried again for
charges arising from the same incident for which jeopardy attached.3 However, the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized the dual sovereignty doctrine, which has been a
controversial exception to the prohibition against double jeopardy."
The dual sovereignty doctrine allows successive prosecutions
for the same course of conduct by separate sovereigns whose authority to punish an offender comes from "distinct sources of
power." 5 The traditional application of this doctrine has generally
been to situations where both the state and federal governments
have prosecuted defendants on charges arising from the same acts.
The doctrine has also been applied to successive prosecutions by
Indian tribes and the federal government.7
In the case of Heath v. Alabama8 the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to determine the applicability of the dual sovereignty
doctrine to successive prosecutions by neighboring states.' The
Court held in Heath that indeed the dual sovereignty doctrine ap1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

2. This note will not touch upon the issue of when jeopardy actually attaches.
3. This constitutional provision was applied to the states in the case of Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
4. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). For a suggested modification of the approach of the
state and federal governments to the dual sovereignty doctrine, see Note, The
Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-State Prosecutions:A Fifth
Amendment Solution, 31 STAN. L. REV. 477 (1979).
5. Heath v. Alabama, 106 S. Ct. 433, 437 (1985).
6. Id. at 443 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121; Abbate, 359 U.S. 187.
7. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.
8. 106 S. Ct. 433.
9. Id. at 437.
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plies to successive prosecutions by two different states and thus
such prosecutions are not barred by the double jeopardy clause. 0
By this ruling the Court has solidified and clarified the acknowledged validity of the doctrine as applied to the state and federal
governments. In addition, the Court has opened a new area for successive prosecutions by state governments.
The purpose of this note is to emphasize that while the dual
sovereignty doctrine is legally sound in its application to successive
prosecutions by different states, care must be taken to prevent
abuse of the doctrine. This note proposes that individual states develop consistent policies to deal with the unique situation in which
the facts of the case allow for the possibility of successive prosecutions. By doing this, the states can assure that the operation of the
doctrine will not result in an injustice to the defendant."1
THE CASE

The petitioner, Larry Gene Heath, hired two men to kidnap
and murder his wife, Rebecca Heath, who was nine months pregnant at the time." Heath was instrumental in bringing about the
13
crime by giving his house keys and car keys to the hired killers.
Mrs. Heath was kidnapped from her home in Russell County, Alabama, and taken across the state line to Troup County, Georgia,
where her body, with a fatal gunshot wound to the head, was later
found.1 4 The evidence indicated that the murder took place in
Georgia and this was not disputed by the respondent, the State of
Alabama.' 5
Heath was arrested by Georgia authorities about five days after his wife's murder following a dual investigation by Georgia and
Alabama officials in which there was some cooperation. 6 Heath
confessed to arranging the kidnapping and murder and was indicted in Troup County, Georgia, on the charge of "malice" murder.17 The indictment basically alleged that Heath caused the
10. Id.
11. In his dissent, Justice Marshall points out the events which he says resulted in Heath receiving a fundamentally unfair trial in Alabama. Id. at 435.
12. Id. at 435.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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death of his wife.'$ The State of Georgia informed Heath that it
intended to seek the death penalty against him. 19
Heath subsequently pleaded guilty to "malice" murder in
Georgia in exchange for a life sentence.20 The benefits of this deal
to Heath were obvious: it was his understanding that he could be
paroled after serving as few as seven years of such a sentence. 21
Unfortunately for Mr. Heath, this fortuitous plea bargain
probably turned out to be a critical factor in the chain of events
which led his case to the Supreme Court. In May of 1982, a Russell
County, Alabama grand jury indicted Heath for murder during a
kidnapping, which is a capital offense.22 Alabama law allows prosecution in Alabama for a crime which is commenced in Alabama,
but which is consummated in another state.23
With his life on the line for an offense to which he had already
pleaded guilty in a neighboring state-with an accompanying large
amount of publicity24-Heath

sought relief from the foreboding

18. The indictment was quoted in Heath as follows:
[The grand jurors] in the name and on behalf of the citizens of Georgia,
charge and accuse LARRY GENE HEATH [et al.] with the offense of
MURDER; for that the said LARRY GENE HEATH [et al.] on the date
of August 31, 1981, in the county aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully and with malice aforethought cause the death of Rebecca McGuire
Heath, a human being, by shooting her with a gun, a deadly weapon.
Id., quoting Record at 740.
19. 106 S. Ct. at 435. This was based on the aggravating circumstance that
Heath "caused and directed" the crime.
20. 106 S. Ct. at 435.
21. Id.
22. Id. The indictment read as follows:
Larry Gene Heath did intentionally cause the death of Rebecca Heath,
by shooting her with a gun, and Larry Gene Heath caused said death
during Larry Gene Heath's abduction of, or attempt to abduct, Rebecca
Heath with intent to inflict physical injury upon her, in violation of §
13A-5-40(a)(1) of the Code of Alabama 1975, as amended, against the
peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.
Id., quoting Record at 728. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (1982) states as follows: "(a)
The following are capital offenses: (1) Murder by the defendant during a kidnapping in the first degree or attempt thereof by the defendant."
23. See ALA. CODE § 15-2-3 (1982):
When the commission of an offense commenced in the State of Alabama is consummated without the boundaries of the State, the offender
is liable to punishment therefore in Alabama; and venue in such case is
in the county in which the offense was commenced, unless otherwise provided by law.
24. 104 S. Ct. at 441 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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situation. His defense was based primarily on two arguments: 1)
that his conviction and sentence in Georgia was a bar to an Alabama prosecution for the same conduct on the grounds of autrefois
convict2 5 and former jeopardy, 6 and 2) that the crime occurred in
27
Georgia and thus Alabama had no jurisdiction to try him.
The trial court held that even if, for the sake of argument, a
single state could not have brought the two charges in succession,
the double jeopardy clause did not bar successive prosecution by
two different states for the same conduct. 28 As to the jurisdictional
argument, the trial court went along with the prosecution's argument that "under Alabama Code § 15-2-3 (1982), if a crime commences in Alabama, it may be punished in Alabama regardless of
' 29
where the crime is consummated.
Heath was convicted at trial in Alabama "of murder during a
kidnapping in the first degree" and was sentenced to death. 0 He
appealed to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on the basis of
autrefois convict and former jeopardy under both the United
States and Alabama constitutions.3 " Heath's conviction was affirmed at the court of criminal appeals and supreme court level in
Alabama. 32 Crucially, Heath failed to raise the jurisdictional issue
25. Id. at 436. "Autrefois Convict - formerly convicted. 'A plea by a criminal

in bar to an indictment that he has been formerly convicted of the same crime.'
Black's Law Dictionary 123 (5th ed. 1979). It must be noted at this point that
Heath was not tried or convicted in Georgia but instead pleaded guilty in a bargain that was certainly beneficial to him in view of the circumstances of the crime.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
26. 106 S.Ct. at 436.
27. Id. See supra text accompanying note 15.
28. Id. at 435.
29. Id. at 436. See supra text accompanying note 23.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Alabama state constitutional provision concerning double jeopardy is similar to the provision in the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution: "That no person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb, but courts may, for reasons fixed by law, discharge juries from the
consideration of any case, and no person shall gain an advantage by reason of
such discharge of the jury." ALA. CONST. art. I § 9.
32. Heath v. State, 455 So. 2d 898 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) and Ex parte
Heath, 455 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1984). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals followed its decision from an earlier case:
A conviction in one State for an act in violation of its laws is not a
bar to a prosecution in another for the same act, if it violates the laws of
the latter State, unless it is otherwise provided by statute, or unless it
has been agreed between the States that the jurisdiction shall vest excluhttps://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/8
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before the Alabama Supreme Court and he was precluded from
raising that issue before the United States Supreme Court.3s
Once the jurisdictional argument was discarded, there remained one clear-cut issue for the high court: "Whether the dual
sovereignty doctrine permits successive prosecutions under the
laws of different States which otherwise would be held to 'subject
[the defendant] for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy?' ",-4 The Court definitively interpreted the dual sovereignty
doctrine to allow successive prosecutions by different states for the
same acts without violation of the fifth amendment.3 5
BACKGROUND

A.

The Double Jeopardy Clause

Man has long held an aversion to the possibility of twice putting an accused in jeopardy. The concept extends back to Roman
times, as was expressed in the Digest of Justinian: "[T]he governor should not permit the same person to be again accused of a
crime of which he had been acquitted.""
The canon law which developed towards the end of the Roman
Empire accorded respect to the theory that a man should not be
twice placed in jeopardy. Church law during that period also espoused this theory saying that God Himself would punish a single
transaction only once. 7
Despite its historic roots, the right not to be twice placed in
jeopardy was held in fairly low regard in the development of the
English law. Double jeopardy was never mentioned in the statutes
of England prior to its adoption into the United States Constitution. 8 Finally in 1676, the modern English rule, which requires an
sively in the State first apprehending and arresting the accused.
Heath v. State, 455 So. 2d 898, 900 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), quoting Hare v. State,
387 So. 2d 299, 300 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §
296(c) (1961).
33. 106 S. Ct. at 436. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that certiorari was not
granted on Heath's objection to Alabama's jurisdiction. Interestingly, Heath's attorneys devoted considerable space to the argument in their briefs before the
United States Supreme Court. Id.
34. Id. at 437, quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V.
35. Id.
36. DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, Bk. 48, Title 2 n.7 (S.P. Scott trans. 1932); XVII
THE CIVIL LAW as quoted in J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 2 (1969).
37. See J. SIGLER, supra note 36, at 3 (1969).
38. J. SIGLER, supra note 36, at 4. Generally punishment was harsher the sec-
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acquittal or conviction to constitute prior jeopardy, was adopted.3 9
The states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire were the
primary proponents of the double jeopardy theory prior to the passage of the Bill of Rights.40 However, it was James Madison of Virginia who successfully pushed for the inclusion of the double jeopardy clause in the Bill of Rights. 4 '
Inclusion of the double jeopardy clause in the fifth amendment did not foreclose the possibility of successive prosecutions
brought by a single state.42 Initially, the reason for this was that
43
the Bill of Rights was directed solely at the federal government.
The fourteenth amendment, which provides that no man shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,44
slowly changed the Court's perception of the application of certain
amendments of the Bill of Rights to the states.43
Only in the last twenty-five years has the Supreme Court "rejected the notion that the fourteenth amendment applies to the
states only a 'watered-down,' subjective version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. ' 46 This is evidenced by the
Court's holding in the early case of Palko v. Connecticut,47 which
was, for practical purposes, the Court's first hearing on the appliond time around during the era of such kings as Henry I. Under his reign a second conviction resulted in a rather narrow choice of punishments: mutilation or
death. Id.
39. Id. at 16, citing Turner's Case, 89 Eng. Rep. 158 (1676).
40. Id. at 23.
41. Id. at 30.
42. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 85 (1902). The Dreyer Court, in dicta,
asked the rhetorical question of whether double jeopardy is "forbidden only by
the Fifth Amendment which prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
had been held as restricting only the powers of the National Government and its
agencies?" Id.
43. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

45. Only recently has the Court begun to strictly apply certain amendments
of the Bill of Rights to the states through the operation of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right
to a trial by jury); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1965) (sixth amendment
right to counsel for indigent defendants); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965)(sixth amendment right of an accused to confront witnesses against him).
46. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964), quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960). Malloy held that the fourteenth amendment protects the right to remain silent in the state context to the same extent as the fifth
amendment does in the federal context. Id. at 8.
47. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/8
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cability of the double jeopardy clause to the states through the
48
fourteenth amendment.
The defendant in Palko had been convicted of second degree
murder and the State appealed. The Connecticut Supreme Court
ordered a new trial because of errors in the exclusion of evidence
and in the instructions submitted to the jury. On retrial the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to
death despite his objection that he had twice been subjected to
jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment."9
The Supreme Court distinguished between rights such as the
right to freedom of speech in the first amendment and other rights
such as the right to a jury trial by saying that the latter are not at
the very essence of ordered liberty.5 0 The Court drew the line as to
which rights should be applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment by asking this question: "Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected [Palko] a hardship so
acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? ' 51 To its
question the Court replied, "no," and implied that the Successive
prosecution was valid because it did not violate "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice."5 2
Thus, the Court freed the states to develop their own standards for double jeopardy. Palko held fast for many years and was
reiterated in cases such as Brock v. North Carolina,53 where a retrial after a mistrial caused by the prosecution's witnesses was held
not to be barred by the fourteenth amendment.
Finally, in Benton v. Maryland,5 ' the Court rejected the
"shocking hardship" standard for invocation of the fourteenth
amendment application against the states. 5 The Court enunciated
the standard which had seen its evolution in the Warren Court
that once a provision of the Bill of Rights is determined to be
48. The issue was presented in the earlier case of Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S.
71 (1902) (see supra note 42), but was not considered because it was unnecessary
to the decision in the case. 187 U.S. at 86.
49. Palko, 302 U.S. at 321-22.
50. Id. at 325.
51. Id. at 328.
52. Id. The Court hinted that its decision could possibly be different if Mr.
Palko's original trial had been free from error. Id.
53. 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
54. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
55. Id. at 795.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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"fundamental to the American scheme of justice" 5 the same standard applies to state and federal governments alike. The Court
went on to note that there was no doubt about the fundamental
nature of the right not to be placed in double jeopardy.5 7 With the
ruling in Benton, the full protection of the double jeopardy clause
was held to apply equally against the state and federal govern58
ments alike.
B.

Development of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine

The beauty of the Constitution is that it can force states to
guarantee inherent rights such as those found in the Bill of Rights
without substantially depriving the states of their independence
and sovereignty. The Supreme Court has recognized the sovereignty of the states and from this sovereignty arises power which
allows the individual states to retain their own unique identities.
Though it retracted the power of states to tax federal entities,
the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland5 9 was beneficial to states in
that without qualification it recognized the states as separate sovereigns. McCulloch summed up the dual sovereignty of the state
and federal governments by stating: "[Plowers of sovereignty are
divided between the government of the Union, and those of the
States. They are each sovereign, with respect to objects committed
to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed
to the other."6 0
The question arose that even if the state and federal governments are two distinct sovereigns, why should they be allowed to
render successive criminal prosecutions for offenses arising from
the same acts? This issue was confronted in Moore v. Illinois,61 in
which the petitioner asserted that state legislation concerning escaped slaves was prevented by federal legislation over the same
subject matter. The Court noted that in relation to the state and
56. Id., quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

57. Id.
58. Id. at 794. In Benton the defendant was acquitted of a larceny charge but

was convicted of a separate offense of burglary which he appealed. He was
granted a new trial at which he was convicted of the larceny charge for which he
had previously been acquitted. This conviction was overturned by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 797. The ruling in Benton, of course, overruled the Court's earlier
holding in Palko, 302 U.S. 319. Id. at 794.
59. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

60. Id. at 410.
61. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/8
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federal governments a citizen owes "allegiance to two sovereigns,
and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of
either. ' 62 The decision made it clear that a single act could be an
offense against the laws of two different sovereigns and could thus
be independently prosecuted by both sovereigns. 3
The developing dual sovereignty doctrine was limited and
more specifically defined in Grafton v. United States,6 4 in which
the defendant was charged under the territorial laws of thehPhillipines for an offense that he had been acquitted of in a courtmartial proceeding. The Court refused to apply the dual sovereignty doctrine to successive prosecutions by the federal government and territories."5
Since a territory exists only at the whim of the federal government, it has no inherent power and cannot be defined as a separate
sovereign. 6 As a result, territorial courts exercise their powers
under the authority of the federal government. Thus, a trial by a
territory after jeopardy has attached for the same offense under
another branch of federal law is barred by the double jeopardy
clause. 7
Cases such as Moore6 recognized the sovereignty and independence of the states in relation to the federal government. 9 In
the 1911 case of Coyle v. Oklahoma,7 0 the Court elucidated the relationship of the states to each other, stating that newly admitted
states have the same respect, sovereignty, and independence as the
original states. The Court expressed the view that the Constitution
looks towards the concept of an "indestructible Union, composed
of indestructible States. 7 1 An important policy consideration
emerged from Coyle that applied directly to the Heath decision.
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. The Court was precise in its language: "[I]t cannot be truly averred
that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense; but only that by
one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly punishable."
Id.
64. 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
65. Id. at 354.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
69. See text accompanying note 62, supra.
70. 221 U.S. 559 (1911). The Court held that Oklahoma's enabling legislation
did not restrict its power to relocate its state capital despite language in the legislation to the contrary. Id. at 579.
71. Id. at 579.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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The Coyle court stated that the "constitutional equality of the
States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon
'7 2
which the Republic was organized.
The decision in Coyle suggested that an application of the
early dual sovereignty theory to successive prosecutions by the
states was mandated. However, the prior decision in Nielson v. Oregon 7 - a 1909 case distinguishable because of its unique facts, acted to confuse the application of the developing dual sovereignty
doctrine.
In Nielson, Congress had given Oregon and Washington concurrent jurisdiction over the waters of the Columbia River, which
formed the border between the two states. 7 The power over the
area did not stem from inherent sovereignty but from a specific
grant by Congress.7 5 The petitioner had fished in the river, an act
prohibited by Oregon but allowed by Washington. The Court held
that Oregon could not prosecute the petitioner for an act done
under Washington authority even though the act was committed in
76
the zone of concurrent jurisdiction.
There was language in Nielson that could be interpreted to
remove any application of the dual sovereignty doctrine from successive prosecutions by the states. The Court stated that if an act
was punishable by the laws of both states, "the one first acquiring
jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality in both States, so that one convicted or acquitted
in the courts of the one State cannot be prosecuted for the same
offense in the courts of the other. ' ' 77 But the effect of this language
is negated because the Court limited its holding to the precise and
unique question presented by a situation where jurisdiction is
granted concurrently by a source, such as Congress, which is de7 8
tached from the inherent sovereignty of the states.
The modern dual sovereignty doctrine found its initial pronunciation in United States v. Lanza.7 9 The Lanza Court upheld
successive prosecutions for an act which violated both federal and
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 580.
212 U.S. 315 (1909).
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.
260 U.S. 377 (1922).
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state law.8 0 There, the Court held that the states' power to prosecute liquor offenses arose not from the eighteenth amendment,8 1
but from the separate power accorded the states by the tenth
amendment.8 2 The Court noted that both the federal and state
governments had the ability to deal with offenses occurring within
the identical geographical area. 83 The Court stated that separate
sovereigns have the right to determine what acts are offensive to
their particular mores, and they can punish those acts without regard to how another sovereign may have previously dealt with the
84
matter.
The Court in Bartkus v. Illinois8" upheld a state prosecution
of the defendant subsequent to his acquittal on federal charges
arising from the same incident, a bank robbery. The Court emphasized the role that the separate sovereignty of
the states plays in
86
the continued strength of the federal system.
The primary motivation for the Bartkus decision was the possibility that an individual could be convicted of a minor offense
under federal law and the state could be precluded from bringing
more serious charges based on the same act. This would effectively
deprive the states of their sovereign obligation to regulate their
own societies.87
About fifteen states had statutes barring successive prosecutions if the defendant had previously been tried "by another gov80. Id. at 385.
81. "After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale,
or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or
the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVIII, repealed 1933. Id. at 379.
82. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382.
83. Id. "We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory." Id.
84. Id. In the context of the specific case before it, the Court stated that
". . a conviction by a court of Washington of the offense against that State is

not a conviction of the different offense against the United States and so is not
double jeopardy." Id. See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1941); Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., 302 U.S.
253 (1937); Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927); Herbert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312 (1926).
85. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
86. Id. at 137.

87. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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ernment for a similar offense. '8 8 The Bartkus Court pointed out
that "the task of determining when the federal and state statutes
are so much alike that a prosecution under the former bars a prosecution under the latter is a difficult one" and the task should be
left to the state governments.8 9 The decision in Bartkus thus did
not foreclose the possibility of states limiting successive prosecutions by their own standards.
In Abbate v. United States,0 the Court was asked to overrule
Lanza,"1 but refused to do so. 92 The Court held that the double
jeopardy clause does not prevent successive state and federal prosecutions, in that order.9 3 Justice Brennan, however, expressed in a
separate opinion the Court's distaste for successive federal prosecutions for the same offense even if the prosecutions were based on
different statutes protecting different interests.9 '
The dual sovereignty doctrine became firmly entrenched with
the decisions in Abbate and Bartkus. Subsequent to Abbate and
Bartkus, the doctrine was analyzed in several different contexts
and its basic premises remained intact. 5 This was true even after
Benton v. Maryland,96 which clarified the application of the double
88. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted).
89. Id.
90. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). The petitioners in Abbate pleaded guilty in Illinois
to conspiracy to destroy the property of another and were given jail terms. The
petitioners subsequently were convicted in federal court for conspiracy to destroy
communications facilities under the control of the United States. The charges
stemmed from the same acts by the petitioners which occurred in a conspiracy
during a labor dispute to destroy microwave towers belonging to Southern Bell
and/or the United States. Id. at 187-89.
91. 260 U.S. 377.
92. Id. at 195. The decision was released the same day as that in Bartkus,
359 U.S. 121. Id. at 189.
93. Id. Abbate is different from Bartkus in that the state prosecution was
first, followed by the federal prosecution. Id. at 196.
94. Id. at 201.
95. See, e.g., Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (The double jeopardy
clause bars successive prosecutions by a municipality and its state. The dual sovereignty doctrine does not apply because the municipality has no inherent power
of its own as all of its authority is derived from the state.). This relationship is
identical to the federal government-territory relationship discussed in Grafton,
206 U.S. 333 (see supra note 64 and accompanying text); but cf. United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (dual sovereignty doctrine allows successive prosecutions by Indian Tribal Courts and the federal government as both are separate
sovereigns having their own distinct and inherent powers).
96. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/8
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jeopardy clause to the states. It was not until Heath that the Court
confronted the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine to successive state prosecutions.
C.

Response of the Federal and State Governments to the Dual

Sovereignty Doctrine
(1) The Federal Government
Shortly after the Bartkus and Abbate decisions the Attorney
General, in a memorandum to United States attorneys, stressed
that Department of Justice policy was to use the privilege of successive prosecutions "sparingly. ' 97 The memo stated that subsequent to a state prosecution, the federal government should prosecute for the same act only if there are "compelling" reasons as
determined by an assistant attorney general in consultation with
the Attorney General. 98 The Attorney General reminded Justice
Department attorneys that they had "a particular duty to act
wisely and with self-restraint in this area."99 Most importantly, the
Attorney General recommended that his subordinates make every
effort to insure (while cooperating with state authorities) that
prosecution occur "where the public interest is best served."10 0
This policy has never had the effect of law, and failure by Justice
Department attorneys to follow the policy has apparently not been
used to overturn any convictions. 10 1
(2) State Governments
The response of state governments to the dual sovereignty
doctrine has been varied. Some, such as New York, have statutorily, with exceptions, barred the state from prosecuting someone
for an offense for which that person has previously been prosecuted by another sovereign.102 Other states have effected the same
97. Memorandum to the United States Attorneys for Release to A.M. Newspapers Monday, April 6, 1959, reprinted in United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d
849, 855-56 n.5 (8th Cir. 1971). This later became known as the "Petite policy" in
reference to a case which subsequently considered its effects. Petite v. United
States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
98. Mechanic, 454 F.2d at 856.
99. Id.

100. Under this approach, the Attorney General felt that even "consideration
of a second prosecution very seldom should arise." Id.
101. See Note, supra note 4, at 488-94.
102. N.Y. CRIM. Pao. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney 1970). There are vague excepPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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limited bar through case law. 10 3 For example, in People v.
Cooper,104 the Michigan Supreme Court stated that a second prosecution is prohibited "unless it appears from the record that the
interests of the State . . .and the jurisdiction which initially prosecuted are substantially different."1 0 5 The court went on to say
such situations must be analyzed on an individual basis. 0 6 In the
meantime, states such as Alabama have continued to allow full adjudication of their interests, unhampered by any barriers to succes10 7
sive prosecution.
ANALYSIS

A.

The Majority Opinion

From the outset of its opinion the Court approached the issues
in Heath purely from the dual sovereignty doctrine perspective. 0 8
In order to do this the Court had to dispose of a prickly thorn
which complicated the case-the issue of jurisdiction. The Court
tions to § 40.20(1). That section states: "A person may not be twice prosecuted for
the same offense." But as stated in the Practice Commentary to § 40.20:
Subdivision 1 . . . states a truism, yet is it the fundamental principle
upon which the other technical and mechanical rules are built. It is also
New York's independent way of turning the national or prevailing verbalism on its ear. Generally because of the dual sovereignty rule, multiple prosecutions, at least between federal and state forums, are permissible with exceptions including prosecution. New York, on the other hand,
bars them generally, allowing exceptions where they may be pursued.
This may seem at first blush to be a sterile difference of no consequence.
Rather, it is of great consequence because it sets the tone, the policy and
the approach to resolution of questions arising under these provisions.
103. See, e.g., People v. Cooper, 398 Mich. 450, 247 N.W.2d 866 (1976)(defendant's acquittal in federal court barred subsequent state prosecution based on
same acts for which the federal charges were brought); Commonwealth v. Mills,
447 Pa. 163, 286 A.2d 638 (1971)(protection of the individual's interest outweighed the interests of the state in a successive prosecution and thus such prosecution was barred). Neither case acts as an absolute bar to successive
prosecutions.
104. 398 Mich. 450, 247 N.W.2d 866 (1976).
105. Id. at 462, 247 N.W.2d at 870.
106. Id.
107. Alabama recognizes the doctrine of Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387
(1969), that there is no dual sovereignty between a state and its municipalities.
Smith v. City of Irondale, 303 So. 2d 126 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974). However, Alabama apparently has no cases concerning application of the dual sovereignty doctrine in the federal-state context.
108. Heath, 106 S. Ct. at 436.
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removed the jurisdictional question from consideration by simply
stating that since Heath had not raised the issue before the Alabama Supreme Court he was "jurisdictionally barred" from raising
it before the United States Supreme Court.1" 9
The Court positioned itself to consider the case unfettered by
the logical implications that the jurisdictional issue might have
raised. The Court followed the precedent that the fifth amendment
bars prosecutions only when the two offenses are the same. 110
Under the dual sovereignty doctrine a single act can constitute two
different offenses in the context of a prosecution by separate
sovereigns."'
The Court traced the development of the dual sovereignty
doctrine and from this history it came up with the key question in
the case: "Whether the two entities that seek successively to prosecute a defendant for the same course of conduct can be termed
separate sovereigns.""' 2 Important to this distinction is the determination of the source of the sovereign's authority to punish the
offender." 3 If it is from "distinct sources of power" then the doc4
trine applies."
The Court noted that if states are sovereign with respect to
the federal government then they are certainly sovereign with respect to each other. 1 5 The decision in United States v. Wheeler"'
was a springboard for the Court to justify an expansive approach
to the doctrine. 1 7 The Court then distinguished the sovereignty of
states to each other from the lack of dual sovereignty contained in
the relationship between a territory and the federal government or
a municipality and a state." 8
Finally the Court smoothly disposed of the sticky issue raised
by the Nielson v. Oregon case which barred successive state prosecutions." 9 The Court stated that any language barring successive
prosecutions was in dicta and that the Nielson case was limited to
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 437.
See Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, and supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
106 S. Ct. at 437.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 438.
435 U.S. 313 (1978). See supra note 95.
Heath, 106 S.Ct. at 438.
Id., citing Waller, 397 U.S. 387; Grafton, 206 U.S. 333.
Id. at 438-39. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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its unique facts. 120 The Court stated that Nielson was relevant
only to jurisdictional issues where "two entities deriv[ed]' 21 their
concurrent jurisidiction from a single source of authority.'
The Court spent little time examining the fact that all prior
applications of the dual sovereignty doctrine were in situations
where both of the sovereigns had physical jurisdiction over the
area in which the crime occurred. For example, in Abbate, the act
committed by the defendant occurred in an area physically within
the sovereigns of Illinois and the United States. 2 In addition, the
application of the doctrine to the state-federal situation seems to
be partially based on the fact that the individual1 2 3has the rights
and responsibilities of citizenship in both entities.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Heath, summed up the implications of dual federal-state citizenship by saying that "the complementary nature of the sovereignty exercised by the federal government and the states places upon a defendant burdens
commensurate with concomitant privileges. 1' 2' The Heath decision
moves this philosophy onto the higher plateau that when a citizen
is in one state he can still be subject to the sovereign powers of
another state if his acts are offensive to that other state.
The Court rejected a "balancing of interests" approach' 2 5 offered by Heath, saying that even if two offenses are identical they
are not the "same offense" for purposes of the double jeopardy
clause if prosecuted by different sovereigns.12 1 Presenting a multitude of citations, the Court concluded that the sovereign interests
of the states required that Alabama be able to enforce its criminal
120. Id. at 439.
121. Id.
122. Abbate, 359 U.S. 187 (1959). This concept was also clearly expressed in
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, as was quoted in note 83.
123. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The same reasons
would also apply to application of the doctrine to the relationship between the
Indian Nation and the federal government. See United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978).
124. Heath, 106 S. Ct. at 443. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. This approach would "restrict the applicability of the dual sovereignty
principle to cases in which two governmental entities, having concurrent jurisdiction and pursuing quite different interests, can demonstrate that allowing only
one entity to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant will interfere with the unvindicated interests of the second entity and that multiple prosecutions therefore
are necessary for the satisfaction of the legitimate interests of both entities." Id.
at 439.
126. Id.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/8
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laws even though it lost the race to the courthouse. 127 With its
opinion, the Court rejuvenated the idea that a state is a separate
against
sovereign and that "a single act constitutes an 'offense'
28
each sovereign whose laws are violated by that act."'
Heath is generally a well-analyzed opinion in light of the alternatives. The Court took the dual sovereignty doctrine, which rests
not only in the Constitution but also in substantial precedent, and
extended it to its natural end. Little argument can be raised
against the theory that states are independent sovereigns whose
powers are inherent. And if those states are independent and sovereign in their relationship to the federal government then they are
also independent and sovereign in relation to each other.
Indeed, one could argue that the sovereignty of the states has
allowed the diversity of the nation to be retained and has perhaps
prevented the usurpation of power by those with autocratic and
nationalistic ideas. The Heath case does, however, give rise to
some questions about the practical applicability of the dual sovereignty doctrine to every case that comes down the pike.
The facts of Heath glaringly beg for the answer to a question
which the Court ignored: Did both states have subject matter jurisdiction over the crime which Heath committed? The Court ignored
the question, ostensibly on procedural grounds. 12 From a practical
approach, a dual sovereignty exception calls for an examination of
the jurisdictional issue prior to reaching the issue concerning successive prosecutions. A more complete consideration of the jurisdictional issue could have given the Heath case more solid precedential value.
The Court pointed out that the evidence indicated that the
murder actually took place in Georgia.' 30 Although the jurisdictional argument was not properly raised, the fact of the location of
the crime should have at least raised an eyebrow at the Supreme
Court level. 13' This note does not take issue with the Alabama
statute which allows trial in Alabama for an offense which is commenced in Alabama but consummated in another state."'3 Analysis
127. Id. at 440.
128. Id.
129. Id. 436-37.
130. Id. at 435.
131. Even Justice Marshall in his dissent failed to explore carefully the legal
implications which could result depending on where the crime took place.
132. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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of an earlier Alabama case, Dolvin v. State, 33 should shed light on
the propriety of successive prosecutions in the Heath case.
In Dolvin, the defendant was involved in the murder of a potential witness against her husband. The victim was abducted in
Alabama and from eyewitness evidence it was apparent that the
fatal wounds were administered in Alabama. It was not known
where the victim actually died. The victim's body was later found
in Florida.""
In the Dolvin situation the Alabama Supreme Court held that
"the state in which the fatal blow was given may maintain a prosecution for the crime of murder, although death occurs in another
state.'

35

The court did not dispute the validity of jury instructions

which stated that "mere abduction" of the victim within the
county of trial was insufficient to justify a murder conviction. 3 '
The trial court required that the jury find that the defendant set
in motion such forces which caused the victim's death within the
Alabama county where the trial was held. The jury so found and
Dolvin's conviction was subsequently upheld. 1 37 Dolvin had apparently not been charged or tried in Florida for the same crime.
When the principles of Dolvin are applied to Heath, it is clear
that the Heath Court's fear of the jurisdictional issue was unfounded. Heath did indeed set into motion the forces that caused
his wife's death and he set those forces in motion within the
boundaries of Alabama. Since Heath was the organizer of the
crime, his acts, though pervasive, were much more subtle than the
administration of the actual death blows.
Heath met the "hit men" in Georgia, led them to Alabama,
gave them access to his house and car and then told them to kill
his wife. 3 ' Also, Heath took steps in Alabama to make the murder
appear to be an accident.

39

Ordering a killing and furthering its

occurrence could arguably beat the "mere abduction" standard
133. 391 So. 2d 666 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979).
134. Id. at 669-71. (Citation omitted).
135. Id. at 674. This was after the court had noted that ALA. CODE § 15-2-3
(1982) does not apply where the crime is a "single indivisible offense." Id. (Citation omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 106 S. Ct. at 435.
139. Heath put a brick in his wife's car to be placed on the gas pedal to give
the appearance of an accident. Heath also left wire to secure the car's steering
wheel. Heath v. State, 455 So. 2d 898, 902 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (Exhibit A).
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mentioned in Dolvin.140
It can equally be argued that in Georgia Heath set into motion
such forces that caused his wife's death. He procured the hit men
in Georgia and the fatal shot was apparently fired in that state. 1 ,
The tougher question would be whether the individuals who
actually carried out Mrs. Heath's murder could constitutionally be
prosecuted in both Georgia and Alabama. All available information
indicates that Heath's accomplices were prosecuted only in Georgia.1 42 Although the accomplices carried out the crime, it appears
that their acts did not rise above the "mere abduction" standard. 143 In other words, the accomplices did not set in motion the
forces which caused Mrs. Heath's death until they fired the fatal
shot in Georgia.
This results in an interesting paradox: since the fatal shot was
fired in Georgia, the "hired guns" were subject to prosecution only
in that state while the instigator, apparently because of his pervasive command over the events, was made subject to prosecution in
both states. A "but for" test shows why this paradox results. "But
for" Mr. Heath's actions in Alabama, the murder would not have
taken place. On the other hand, his accomplices could have ultimately foregone the murder despite their actions in Alabama." 4
The Supreme Court did not analyze the case in this context but it
certainly helps to explain the logic of the Alabama courts.
140. 391 So. 2d 666.

141. 106 S.Ct. at 435.
142. Heath v. State, 455 So. 2d at 900-01. The court listed as follows the
disposition of the cases against Heath's accomplices:
The defendant's girlfriend, Denise Paige Lambert, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.
Sanders Williams, who was hired to commit the murder but disappeared
after several attempts "fell through," also pled guilty to conspiracy to
commit murder and received a ten-year sentence.
Jerry Heath, the defendant's brother, who allegedly furnished the
defendant with the name of someone who would commit the murder, was
tried and acquitted. The two hired assassins, Charles Edward Owens and
Gregory Hughes Lumpkin, were convicted of murder and received life
sentences.
Id. at 901.
143. As discussed in Dolvin, 391 So. 2d 666, and supra note 133 and accompanying text.
144. Conceivably Mr. Heath could have tracked down his accomplices, but he
did not. This relieves us of having to consider the obtuse question of whether Mr.
Heath could have set in motion the forces which caused his wife's death when she,
in fact, did not die.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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Prosecutors should not hastily interpret Heath to allow successive prosecutions in, for example, every situation where a victim
is kidnapped in one state and murdered in another state. Though
the Court offers no words of limitation of the law of Heath, it is
clear that jurisdictional requirements will confine consecutive prosecutions by states to very unique fact situations such as that found
in Heath.
The dual sovereignty doctrine allowing successive prosecutions
by different states is justified in situations where the crime is of a
conspiratorial nature and/or is obviously directly offensive to the
sensibilities of the citizens of two different states.'4 5 But this does
not withdraw from prosecutors the serious responsibility to insure
that the dual sovereignty doctrine is not abused.
For example, had Heath been fully tried in Georgia, found
guilty and given life in prison without the possibility of parole, Alabama officials would have had to seriously debate whether they
had a substantial residual interest in the case. 148 Had such a situation arisen and if Heath was subsequently prosecuted in Alabama
and given the death penalty, the Court might not have been quite
14
so liberal in its interpretation of the dual sovereignty doctrine. 1
Unquestionably, in such a situation the Court would have to seriously consider invocation of the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, due to the psychological
impact on the defendant.
With the recognition of the dual sovereignty doctrine comes a
responsibility of the states to draw guidelines which will prevent
abuse of the doctrine. Such abuse could lead to a future overruling
of Heath or at least a limitation of it to its particular facts.
States could determine if successive prosecutions are appropriate in the following manner:
145. See, e.g., State v. Straw, 626 S.W.2d 286 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (the
defendant swindled a Tennessee man out of $500,000 and deposited the money in
a Massachusetts bank. Massachusetts saw fit to give the defendant only twenty
months in prison while the Tennessee court gave him five years. The appellate
court held this action to be justified by the dual sovereignty doctrine.).
146. Although the Court made a similar assumption for argument's sake, the
Court's assumption was used merely for the purpose of showing that the Heath
decision was based on a situation where jeopardy normally would have attached.
106 S. Ct. at 437.
147. Although crimes against separate sovereigns are by definition different
offenses, it is hard to conceive that the Court would look favorably upon an obvious "shotgun" effort to prosecute a defendant in different states until he received
the death penalty.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/8
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1) When it becomes apparent that the same act could give rise
to offenses in two different states, the respective prosecutors
should meet to discuss which state has the most substantial interest in the crime. That state would then prosecute the defendant.
2) If the other state felt that for some reason (such as a fortuitous plea bargain as in the Heath case) its interests were not represented in the initial prosecution, a second prosecution could be
studied.
3) If, after consultation with the state attorney general the
county prosecutor determined that there were "compelling" reasons for another prosecution, a second prosecution could be
ordered.148

These standards of self-regulation could be used to prevent
abuse of the opportunity for successive prosecutions. They would
also help to insure that successive prosecutions would remain a viable option.
States desiring strict adherence to standards such as those
above could codify them. This would allow review by the state
courts of the propriety of a second prosecution.
An additional safeguard could be created by use of the judiciary. In cases such as Heath, a special judge in the "second state"
could conduct a hearing after the case is completed in the initial
prosecuting state. This hearing would be similar to a probable
cause hearing in that the prosecutor would submit evidence to the
court to show why the defendant should be tried in the second
state. The evidence would have to rise to a level which shows
"compelling" reasons for prosecution in the second state. Such reasons would relate primarily to whether there was a failure to vindicate the second state's interest in the initial prosecution. Independent review by an initial court, not the trial court, would help to
keep the real issues in perspective. Evidence concerning the prior
trial and the sentence would be admissible before the judge for the
purpose of determining whether there was complete adjudication
in light of the laws of the second state.
B. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent

9

that Heath's

148. This policy would be similar to the voluntary Petite policy (used by the
Justice Department) which was described in the text to note 97-100, supra.
149. With whom Justice Brennan joined. 106 S. Ct. at 441. Justice Brennan
also wrote a short dissent in which he held to his separate opinion in Abbate, 359
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trial was unfair in that seventy-five of the eighty-two potential jurors were aware of Heath's prior guilty plea in Georgia. Marshall
sardonically characterized the resulting jury as "well-informed."' 50
Marshall is probably correct in his assertion that Heath's trial
was not held under ideal circumstances. However, this is one of the
necessary by-products of successive prosecutions. By the same token, had Heath been acquitted in Georgia, it could have been
equally as well-known and might have prejudiced the Alabama
jury in his favor.
Delving into the legal argument, Justice Marshall warned that
the reasons for the dual sovereignty doctrine should be investigated before extending it to a new area. 15 ' Marshall's view was that
the doctrine, as applied to the state-federal government relationship, arose from the distinct interests the two sovereigns might
have in adjudicating a matter. 52 Marshall went on to say that the
53
sovereign concerns of the states are identical.
Obviously the sovereign concerns of the states are different-in fact, if not in theory-as is evidenced by the widely disparate laws that are found in the fifty states. For example, some
states favor capital punishment while others do not.' 5 ' While there
is no definitive evidence that capital punishment acts as a general
deterrent, 5 5 a rule of law preventing a state which has capital punishment from prosecuting a defendant who has commenced a murder in that state, but consummated it across the state line, would
be a serious affront against the sovereignty of the original state. It
could also lead to eventual abuse of the criminal law applying to
less serious offenses in situations where neighboring states offer
widely disparate penalties for identical crimes.
CONCLUSION

The Court in Heath held that successive prosecutions by two
states for identical acts are not barred by the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment due to application of the dual soverU.S. 187, that "the different purposes or interest served by specific statutes cannot justify an exception to our established double jeopardy law." Id. at 441.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 443.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 444.
154. See generally, W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE (1984).
155. See E. BLOCK, WHEN MEN PLAY GOD (1983).
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eignty doctrine. 56 This holding is consistent with previous rulings
of the Court as applied to separate sovereign units.
The ruling allows states to prosecute someone who has already
been adjudicated for the same offense in another state as long as
the crime avails itself to the jurisdiction of the prosecuting state.
Defense attorneys should be aware of the possibility of successive
prosecutions, especially when making plea bargain arrangements.
Most importantly, the states should make efforts to insure
that successive prosecutions are used only to further legitimate
state interests.
Clifton Walker Homesley

156. 106 S. Ct. at 437.
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